Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2024

 Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan

Might 13, 2024, 8:45pm ET

Click on here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date day by day alongside the static maps current on this report.

Click on here to see ISW’s 3D management of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a pc (not a cellular gadget) is strongly advisable for utilizing this data-heavy software.

Click on here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces day by day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.

Observe: The info cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on Might 13. ISW will cowl subsequent stories within the Might 14 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.

Russian forces continued to make tactically vital advances north and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis on Might 13 and presently seem like prioritizing the fast institution of a “buffer zone” alongside the worldwide border over setting situations for deeper penetrations into northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage revealed on Might 13 reveals that Russian forces have superior into Hlyboke (north of Lyptsi) and raised a flag within the middle of the village, however Russian sources claimed that Russian forces haven’t but seized everything of Hlyboke and superior west of the settlement alongside the west (left) financial institution of the Kharkiv River.[1] Extra geolocated footage reveals that Russian forces superior southwest of Oliinykove (northeast of Lyptsi) and north of Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi and southeast of Oliinykove).[2] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces achieved unspecified tactical success close to Lukyantsi.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Lukyantsi, however ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of this declare.[4] Russian forces additionally continued attacking within the Lyptsi course close to Pylna (northeast of Lyptsi and Oliinykove), and the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Hlyboke.[5]

Geolocated footage revealed on Might 12 reveals that Russian forces seized the Vovchansk Meat Processing Plant in northern Vovchansk, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces additionally captured a shoe manufacturing facility in northern Vovchansk on the morning of Might 13 and superior into central Vovchansk as much as the northern (proper) financial institution of the Vovcha River by the night.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are additionally clearing Starytsya and Buhruvatka (each west of Vovchansk on the C-210817 highway) however that Russian forces don’t management the settlements, and in addition superior in a forest space additional south of Ohirtseve (northwest of Vovchansk).[7] Russian forces additionally attacked on the Izbytske-Starytsya-Buhruvatka line west of Vovchansk and close to Tykhe (east of Vovchansk), the place the Russian MoD additionally reported Ukrainian counterattacks.[8] Russian sources claimed that combating continued between the Lyptsi and Vovchansk salients close to Zelene (on the worldwide border between Lyptsi and Vovchansk) and that Ukrainian forces partially withdrew from Ternova (instantly southeast of Zelene).[9]

Russian forces’ comparatively fast charge of advances in Vovchansk and their reported destruction of a number of bridges throughout key waterways inside the settlement recommend that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a “buffer zone” over a deeper penetration, as ISW beforehand assessed they might.[10]  ISW has not but noticed claims or affirmation that Russian forces have crossed to the southern (left) financial institution of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk or its quick environs. Russian forces notably carried out strikes towards bridges over the Vovcha River instantly west and east of Vovchansk on Might 12 and commenced concentrating on bridges over the river and logistics strains in Vovchansk itself on Might 13, reportedly solely leaving Ukrainian forces with two usable bridges over the Vovcha in Vovchansk.[11] It’s unclear why Russian forces would largely goal bridges they would wish to cross and guarantee steady logistics throughout the Vovcha River for offensive operations deeper into northern Kharkiv Oblast, so these strikes recommend that Russian forces could also be prioritizing quick positive aspects in an unfortified space of northern Ukraine. Russian forces are additionally reportedly fielding armor on this space — Russian sources reported that Russian forces carried out a mechanized assault with an unspecified variety of tanks towards Vovchansk on the evening of Might 12 and continued armored assaults throughout the day on Might 13.[12] The deployment of armored belongings on this space means that Russian forces are searching for to make fast positive aspects, however they don’t seem like setting situations at the moment for such positive aspects to be on the southern aspect of the Vovcha River deeper into northern Kharkiv Oblast. These indicators collectively recommend that Russian forces are probably making an attempt to create the promised “buffer zone” within the border space as a substitute of pursuing deeper positive aspects into Kharkiv Oblast or in direction of Kharkiv Metropolis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and different Kremlin officers have regularly urged that Russia set up a “demilitarized buffer zone” in occupied Ukraine to guard Russian territory from Ukrainian strikes, and Russian Ambassador to america Anatoly Antonov straight linked this buffer zone with intensified Russian offensive operations south of Belgorod Oblast on Might 13.[13] Ukrainian and Western officers have additionally just lately acknowledged that Russian forces intend to ascertain a 10-kilometer buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast, and ISW has just lately famous that this buffer zone would concurrently deliver Russian forces inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis and take away main Russian logistics hubs from Ukrainian tube artillery vary.[14] A Ukrainian battlefield commander just lately expressed concern that Ukrainian fortifications in northern Kharkiv Oblast should not alongside the quick worldwide border space, enabling Russian forces’ fast and comparatively shallow advance.[15] Extra senior Ukrainian commanders have just lately acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have established a multi-layered defense-in-depth deeper within the oblast, which is congruent with the opposite battlefield commanders’ stories.[16] The present tempo of Russian advances on this axis just isn’t essentially indicative of the additional offensive capabilities of the Russian forces conducting the offensive operations, though Russia reportedly retains appreciable reserves out there to take advantage of preliminary successes on this axis.

Newly appointed Russian Safety Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu participated in his first Safety Council assembly as secretary on Might 13, amid continued stories that Russian President Vladimir Putin is specializing in mobilizing the Russian economic system and protection industrial base (DIB) to help a protracted struggle in Ukraine.[17] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov clarified that Shoigu will even be a “curator” of the Russian Army-Industrial Fee however won’t lead it.[18] Russian opposition information outlet Meduza reported on Might 13, citing its sources within the Russian authorities and presidential administration, that Shoigu’s alleged criticisms of Russian state-owned protection conglomerate Rostec Basic Director Sergei Chemezov for failing to supply a ample variety of trendy weapons to the Russian army for the previous a number of months contributed to Shoigu’s elimination from the Russian MoD.[19] This declare additional emphasizes that Putin is concentrated on enhancing the Russian DIB’s capability and skill to modernize and produce new applied sciences.[20] A number of Russian milbloggers expressed hope that Shoigu’s elimination as protection minister and Andrei Belousov’s appointment will enhance the bureaucratic points inside the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) and the Russian DIB’s effectivity.[21] Russian milbloggers additionally largely tried to alleviate considerations that Belousov’s lack of army expertise would hinder his potential to successfully function protection minister and portrayed him as a reliable supervisor who can root out corruption.[22] Belousov’s lack of army expertise just isn’t anomalous within the context of Putin’s ministerial administration, and Shoigu additionally lacked army expertise earlier than changing into protection minister.[23] Putin has all the time appointed a civilian protection minister since firing Boris Yeltsin-appointed Protection Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev in 2001.[24]

Putin’s choice to take away Shoigu from the Russian MoD seems to have additionally opened the door for the departure of sure Shoigu associates from the MoD, probably one of many meant results of Putin’s current cupboard reshuffles. A number of Russian milbloggers and insider sources claimed on Might 13 that two deputy protection ministers—Ruslan Tsalikov and Alexey Krivoruchko—submitted their resignations to Shoigu every week earlier than Putin eliminated Shoigu as protection minister.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Tsalikov was “Shoigu’s right-hand man” for a few years and oversaw troop help and the Russian MoD’s division on info coverage and knowledge warfare.[26] Krivoruchko can also be reportedly shut with Shoigu and oversaw military-technical help, weapons improvement, particular tools, and the implementation of state protection orders.[27] Russian sources claimed that each Tsalikov and Krivoruchko have been embroiled in corruption scandals, and one Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger famous that frontline troops straight suffered because of their corrupt practices.[28] Russian insider sources claimed that Russian authorities questioned Tsalikov over potential corruption prices in late April, and urged on the time that Tsalikov could be compelled into retirement.[29] Russian authorities just lately eliminated former Deputy Protection Minister Timur Ivanov, additionally a reported shut Shoigu ally, from his place on corruption prices.[30] Tsalikov and Krivoruchko could have resigned in hope of receiving new positions exterior of the MoD with a view to keep away from felony prosecution on prices much like Ivanov’s prices. Kremlin-awarded milblogger urged that Tsalikov will even take a brand new function within the Russian Safety Council following Shoigu.[31] Russian insider sources speculated that Belousov, as new protection minister, will solely need to depart a most of two to a few officers affiliated with Shoigu within the Russian MoD, suggesting that extra Shoigu associates should resign or be fired within the coming weeks.[32] One Russian milblogger speculated that Shoigu and his associates have been a part of the alleged “pro-China” social gathering within the Russian MoD and urged that different MoD officers related to Russia’s China coverage can be eliminated or resign alongside Shoigu, Ivanov, and others, though ISW can not confirm these speculations.[33] Putin probably used the constitutionally mandated ministerial resignations following his inauguration and subsequent nomination of latest senior officers as a handy second to dismiss ineffective officers. Putin probably assessed that Shoigu’s constitutionally mandated resignation, nearly a 12 months after deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebel to take away Shoigu and Russian Chief of the Military Basic Workers Valery Gerasimov from energy, was the suitable time to take away Shoigu from the Russian MoD with out showing to present in to Prigozhin’s calls for.

Ukrainian forces reportedly carried out profitable missile strikes towards a Russian air protection base in occupied Crimea and profitable drone strikes towards Russian power infrastructure in Russia. Russian opposition information outlet Astra reported, citing a supply within the Crimean occupation Ministry of Emergency Providers, that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian air protection base of the third Radio Engineering Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces’ [VKS] radio engineering troops) on Mount Ai-Petri in occupied Crimea on Might 13, probably with a number of Storm Shadow missiles.[34] Astra reported that the strike killed an unspecified variety of Russian personnel and sure the commander of the third Radio Engineering Regiment. Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on Might 13 that one in every of its sources within the Ukrainian army confirmed the Mount Ai-Petri strike.[35] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 4 Storm Shadow missiles and 7 drones over Crimea.[36] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on Might 13 that its sources in Ukraine’s Safety Service (SBU) acknowledged that the SBU carried out a drone strike towards the Oskolneftesnabzheniye oil depot close to Stary Oskol, Belgorod Oblast, and the Yeletskaya electrical substation in Lipetsk Oblast, which provides traction substations to Russian Railways, the Stanovaya oil pumping station, and transit between Lipetsk, Oryol, and Bryansk oblasts’ energy programs.[37] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed that Russian forces suppressed drones in Lipetsk Oblast and acknowledged {that a} hearth occurred at {an electrical} substation, presumably attributable to one of many Ukrainian drones.[38]

Breaking Protection reported on Might 13 that Estonia could also be contemplating sending its troops to Ukrainian rear areas with a view to unlock Ukrainian troops for redeployment to extra important areas of the theater.[39] Nationwide Safety Advisor to the Estonian President, Madis Roll, instructed Breaking Protection that the Estonian authorities is “critically” contemplating sending Estonian troops to western Ukraine to take over non-combat roles within the rear from Ukrainian troops, permitting Ukrainian forces to deploy to frontline areas. Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė famous on Might 8 that the Lithuanian authorities has granted permission for Lithuanian troops to serve in comparable non-combat rear space coaching roles sooner or later.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continued to make tactically vital advances north and northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis on Might 13 and presently seem like prioritizing the fast institution of a “buffer zone” alongside the worldwide border over setting situations for deeper penetrations into northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian forces’ comparatively fast charge of advances in Vovchansk and their reported destruction of a number of bridges throughout key waterways inside the settlement recommend that Russian forces are prioritizing the creation of a “buffer zone” over a deeper penetration, as ISW beforehand assessed they might.
• Newly appointed Russian Safety Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu participated in his first Safety Council assembly as secretary on Might 13, amid continued stories that Russian President Vladimir Putin is specializing in mobilizing the Russian economic system and protection industrial base (DIB) to help a protracted struggle in Ukraine.
• Putin’s choice to take away Shoigu from the Russian MoD seems to have additionally opened the door for the departure of sure Shoigu associates from the MoD, probably one of many meant results of Putin’s current cupboard reshuffles.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly carried out profitable missile strikes towards a Russian air protection base in occupied Crimea and profitable drone strikes towards Russian power infrastructure in Russia.
• Russian forces just lately made confirmed advances close to Lyptsi and Vovchansk in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• The Russian army could also be intensifying efforts to recruit conscripts by means of the Russian Volunteer Society for Help to the Military, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) as a part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

We don’t report intimately on Russian struggle crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t straight have an effect on the army operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We’ll proceed to guage and report on the consequences of those felony actions on the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle and the Geneva Conventions and crimes towards humanity regardless that we don’t describe them in these stories.

• Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate important efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis
• Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts
• Russian Technological Variations
• Actions in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Protection Industrial Base Efforts
• Russian Data Operations and Narratives
• Important Exercise in Belarus

Russian Predominant Effort – Japanese Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian goal: Push Ukrainian forces again from the worldwide border with Belgorod Oblast and strategy to inside tube artillery vary of Kharkiv Metropolis)

NOTE: ISW is including a bit to cowl Russian offensive operations alongside the Belgorod-Kharkiv axis as these offensive operations comprise an operational effort separate from Russian offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. ISW could enlarge the scope of this part ought to Russian forces broaden offensive operations alongside the Russian-Ukrainian worldwide border in northeastern Ukraine.

See topline textual content.

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into japanese Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove line on Might 13 however didn’t make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported Russian floor assaults northeast of Kupyansk close to Synkivka; east of Kupyansk close to Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk close to Ivanivka and Berestove; northwest of Svatove close to Stelmakhivka; and southwest of Svatove close to Makiivka and Novoyehorivka.[41] Russian milbloggers posted footage of Russian dismounted infantry conducting an assault on trenches close to Stelmakhivka below the duvet of tank hearth.[42]

Russian forces just lately carried out an unsuccessful roughly strengthened platoon-sized mechanized assault west of Kreminna. Ukrainian sources posted footage of Ukrainian forces destroying 5 tanks (together with one T-90) and 5 BMP infantry combating autos (IFVs) between Torske and Terny (each west of Kreminna).[43] A Russian milblogger confirmed that the assault occurred close to Torske and that Russian forces misplaced a number of tanks.[44] The milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces marginally superior within the space north of Torske and south of Yampolivka (additionally west of Kreminna).[45] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that there have been 10 fight engagements within the Lyman course west of Kreminna all through the day.[46]

Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in occupied Sorokyne (Krasnodon), Luhansk Oblast on Might 13.[47] Kremlin newswire TASS and different Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used not less than three ATACMS missiles to strike an industrial zone, whereas Ukrainian sources famous that the strikes particularly hit an ammunition depot.[48] Sorokyne (Krasnodon) is notably 130 kilometers away from the frontline.

Russian Subordinate Predominant Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize everything of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces carried out restricted offensive operations within the Siversk course (northeast of Bakhmut) on Might 13 however didn’t advance. The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian floor assaults northeast of Siversk close to Bilohorivka; east of Siversk close to Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk close to Spirne and Vyimka; and south of Siversk close to Rozdolivka.[49] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked close to Spirne and Rozdolivka.[50] Components of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (2nd Luhansk Folks’s Republic Military Corps [LNR AC]) reportedly proceed working close to Spirne.[51]

Ukrainian forces just lately regained a misplaced place northeast of Chasiv Yar whereas heavy combating continued round Chasiv Yar on Might 13. Geolocated footage revealed on Might 12 reveals Ukrainian forces seizing and clearing a Russian-held place within the forest space in southwestern Bohdanivka.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces try to develop offensive operations from the western outskirts of Bohdanivka in direction of Kalynivka (north of Chasiv Yar), presumably to set situations to encompass Chasiv Yar by way of its northern flank.[53] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are advancing on the southern flank of Chasiv Yar, significantly west of Ivanivske and within the Stupky- Holubovski 2 nature reserve space.[54] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces broke by means of Ukrainian defenses and entered Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar), however one other milblogger refuted this declare and famous that the purported Russian assault on Klishchiivka was unsuccessful and resulted within the lack of “nearly the complete assault group.”[55] ISW has not but noticed visible proof of the purported Russian assault on Klishchiivka. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian artillery brigade working within the Chasiv Yar space reported that there are as much as 25,000 Russian personnel dedicated to the Chasiv Yar effort, together with a mixture of “elite” (probably airborne [VDV]) and mobilized personnel from the first Donetsk Folks’s Republic Military Corps (DNR AC) and 2nd LNR AC.[56] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported fight engagements north of Chasiv Yar close to Hryhorivka; east of Chasiv Yar close to Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar close to Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[57] Components of the Russian 98th VDV Division and BARS-13 (Fight Reserve) are reportedly working close to Chasiv Yar.[58]

Russian forces reportedly continued to advance west of Avdiivka on Might 13. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces superior west of Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka) in direction of Novooleksandrivka.[59] Some milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces superior west of Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and as much as 1.13 kilometers deep alongside a 3.52-kilometer-wide entrance in direction of Umanske (west of Avdiivka).[60] ISW has not but noticed visible affirmation of those claims, nevertheless. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are typically attacking north of Avdiivka on the Arkhanhelske line; northwest of Avdiivka on the Solovyove-Novopokrovske line; west of Avdiivka in direction of Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka on the Netaylove-Pervomaiske-Nevelske line.[61]

Russian forces reportedly continued to advance west and southwest of Donetsk Metropolis on Might 13. A number of Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing in direction of central Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk Metropolis), with one milblogger claiming that Russian forces superior as much as three kilometers close to Krasnohorivka.[62] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are additionally advancing inside and in fields south of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk Metropolis), though ISW has not noticed visible affirmation of positive aspects on this space.[63] The Ukrainian Basic Workers reported that Russian forces carried out 18 floor assaults within the Kurakhove (west of Donetsk Metropolis) course, together with close to Krasnohorivka and Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk Metropolis).[64] Components of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade and twentieth Motorized Rifle Division (each of the eighth Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) and the fifth Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) reportedly proceed to function close to and in Krasnohorivka.[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on Might 3, however there have been no confirmed adjustments to the frontline within the space. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces superior northward inside Robotyne and in fields east of Robotyne, though ISW has not but noticed visible affirmation of those claims.[66] Positional engagements additionally continued close to Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[67] Components of the Russian forty second Motorized Rifle Division (58th Mixed Arms Military [CAA], Southern Army District [SMD]) reportedly proceed working close to Robotyne.[68]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) financial institution Kherson Oblast, together with close to Krynky, on Might 13.[69]  A Russian soldier reportedly working on an island within the Dnipro River Delta claimed that Russian forces are sometimes unable to evacuate wounded personnel from these islands attributable to ongoing issues with Russian boats in Kherson Oblast and intensive Ukrainian drone protection within the space.[70]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Marketing campaign (Russian Goal: Goal Ukrainian army and civilian infrastructure within the rear and on the frontline)

The Wall Avenue Journal (WSJ) revealed an investigation on Might 13 detailing how Ukrainian shoot-down charges for Russian drones and missiles have dramatically decreased previously six months attributable to extra frequent Russian strikes, more and more various Russian strike packages, and a scarcity of US-provided air protection programs.[71] WSJ discovered that Ukrainian forces have intercepted 46 p.c of Russian missiles over the previous six months, in comparison with the 73 p.c interception charge from the earlier six-month interval, and that the interception charge dipped to 30 p.c over the previous month. WSJ additionally reported that Russian forces have fired 45 p.c extra drones and missiles over the previous six months than the earlier six months, together with double the variety of Shahed drones. WSJ discovered that ballistic missiles and transformed S-300/400 surface-to-air missiles are a lot more durable for Ukrainian forces to shoot down, noting that Ukrainian forces have intercepted 10 p.c of ballistic missiles and not one of the S-300/S-400s. WSJ‘s findings are according to ISW’s evaluation that Ukrainian forces have had a a lot decrease interception charge, significantly since mid-March 2024, largely attributable to dwindling shares of US-provided Patriot air protection programs.[72] ISW has additionally carefully tracked how Russian forces are experimenting and adapting their strike packages to greatest exploit weaknesses in Ukraine’s air protection umbrella, according to WSJ‘s reporting.[73]

Ukraine’s Predominant Army Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on Might 13 that the Russian twenty second Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, significantly its 121st and 52nd heavy bomber aviation regiments, are chargeable for a number of missile strikes on Ukraine.[74] The GUR acknowledged that the 121st and 52nd regiments function from Engels Air Base (Saratov Oblast) and Shaykovka Air Base (Kaluga Oblast). The GUR famous that Russian forces function Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers, which hearth Kh-101/555/55 cruise missiles, from Engels Air Base and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers, which hearth Kh-22/32 cruise missiles, from the Shaykovka Air Base.

Russian Mobilization and Pressure Era Efforts (Russian goal: Develop fight energy with out conducting common mobilization)

The Russian army could also be intensifying efforts to recruit conscripts by means of the Russian Volunteer Society for Help to the Military, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) as a part of ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts. DOSAAF Chairperson Military Basic Alexander Dvornikov (former Southern Army District commander and failed Russian theater commander in Ukraine from April-Might 2022) introduced on Might 13 that DOSAAF is reducing its membership age from 18 to 14.[75] DOSAAF trains residents aged 17 to 30 years getting ready for skilled army service in army specialties and trains civilians aged 18 to 65 who’re a part of the overall mobilizable reserve (“personnel mobilization useful resource” or zapas). DOSAAF additionally supplies military-patriotic training and teaches army abilities to Russian youth and youth in occupied Ukraine.[76] ISW assessed in February 2024 that Dvornikov’s choice to move DOSAAF means that the Russian army management could also be setting situations to reconstitute a conscript recruitment pipeline utilizing DOSAAF’s instructional and recruitment infrastructure.[77] DOSAAF could have lowered its membership age to extend the variety of militarily-trained youth that the Russian army can later conscript after which mobilize, with out having to name further waves of partial mobilization.

Russian army personnel within the just lately dissolved Donetsk Folks’s Republic’s (DNR) Ministry of Inner Affairs (MVD) “Kaskad” Operational Fight Tactical Formation appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin over a scarcity of financial and veteran social advantages related to the continued dissolution of the Kaskad formation. Kaskad personnel recorded a video message to Putin and claimed that they’d solely acquired 100,000 rubles (about $1,100) between January and Might 2024 regardless of persevering with to function in Ukraine.[78] The Kaskad personnel claimed that previous to January 2024 they acquired month-to-month salaries of about 245,000 rubles (about $2,675) from the Russian authorities and the DNR. In addition they claimed that Kaskad formally ceased to exist on April 30, 2024, and that they don’t have sufficient cash to return house. The Kaskad personnel additional claimed that Russian army authorities refuse to situation them fight veteran certificates, thereby prohibiting them from receiving veterans’ social and well being advantages. ISW reported in December 2023 that the Russian army disbanded Kaskad, probably as a part of Russia’s ongoing pressure formalization marketing campaign.[79]

Russian Technological Variations (Russian goal: Introduce technological improvements to optimize programs to be used in Ukraine)  

Russian protection firm “PPSh Laboratory” Basic Director Denis Oslomenko claimed on Might 13 that Russian forces have began utilizing robotic drone suppressors based mostly on Triton digital warfare (EW programs) to cowl army personnel in contested “gray zones” whereas they evacuate wounded and lifeless personnel from the battlefield in Ukraine.[80] Oslomenko acknowledged that Russia hopes to extra broadly produce and distribute these programs to the Russian army.

Ukrainian Protection Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian goal: Develop its protection industrial base to grow to be extra self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and worldwide companions)

ISW just isn’t publishing protection of Ukrainian protection industrial efforts in the present day.

Actions in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, army, and governance programs)

ISW just isn’t publishing protection of actions in Russian-occupied areas in the present day.

Russian Data Operations and Narratives

See topline textual content.

Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its army presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)

Belarus and the Folks’s Republic of China (PRC) proceed to accentuate bilateral cooperation. The Minsk Metropolis Government Committee’s Press Service reported on Might 13 {that a} committee delegation visited Beijing and signed an settlement on know-how and knowledge cooperation between 2024-2026 with Beijing Metropolis officers.[81]

Observe: ISW doesn’t obtain any labeled materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly out there info, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially out there satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these stories. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.

[1] https://twitter.com/rollowastaken/standing/1789985027222061341; https://t.me/NorthZV/138; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10585; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10597; . https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10613; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68061

[2] https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/273; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5496; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/standing/1789964807895998493; https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/273; https://t.me/gostrikartuzy/251; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14795; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5490; https://t.me/motopatriot/22776; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl;

[3] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl;

[4] https://t.me/rybar/60014; https://t.me/motopatriot/22809; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26798

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/38721

[6] https://t.me/rybar/60014;https://twitter.com/justincbzz/standing/1789881700748558434; https://twitter.com/RALee85/standing/1789876549841310195; https://twitter.com/justincbzz/standing/1789881700748558434; https://twitter.com/RALee85/standing/1789876549841310195; https://t.me/rybar/60014; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10613; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26798; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8251; https://t.me/russvolcorps/987; https://twitter.com/Danspiun/standing/1790091162910364073; https://t.me/motopatriot/22823; https://t.me/rybar/60024  

[7] https://t.me/rybar/60024; https://t.me/rybar/60014

[8] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ELTGQXJKU9Qpi4Ms6x1yJXXUHZGT865MeLeWemiQqRGzK8Ja7wkP4Nr6q1GwSdJ9l; https://t.me/mod_russia/38721; https://t.me/rybar/60014; https://t.me/rybar/60014; https://t.me/wargonzo/19902

[9] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68020; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68020; https://t.me/dva_majors/42404; https://t.me/dva_majors/42404; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17677; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10458

[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051124

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024; https://t.me/dva_majors/42478; https://t.me/rybar/60024; https://t.me/rybar/60024; https://t.me/rybar/60024;

[12] https://t.me/kommunist/19060; https://t.me/dva_majors/42391; https://t.me/dva_majors/42391 

[13] https://tass dot ru/politika/20776671; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar013124 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024

[15] https://t.me/bbcrussian/64927 ; https://www.bbc dot com/russian/articles/cw0vv42w7z5o

[16] https://t.me/bbcrussian/64920; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/05/13/u-sylah-pidtrymky-zsu-rozpovily-yaki-fortyfikacziyi-roblyat-z-betonu-a-yaki-ni/; https://suspilne dot media/745005-komanduvac-sil-pidtrimki-zsu-poasniv-ak-buduut-fortifikacii/; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/792136596432754

[17] https://t.me/tass_agency/248611 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/248612 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/248615

[18] https://t.me/tass_agency/248625

[19] https://meduza dot io/characteristic/2024/05/13/pochemu-novym-ministrom-oborony-budet-ekonomist-belousov-za-chto-uvolili-shoygu-i-chto-teper-izmenitsya

[20] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024

[21] https://t.me/philologist_zov/964 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/11178 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17652 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42387 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/17140 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/35924 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42378; https://t.me/dva_majors/42379; https://t.me/dva_majors/42381; https://t.me/dva_majors/42385 

[22] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/35924 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17652 ; https://t.me/Alekhin_Telega/10209 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10594 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56197

[23] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/m-le-mag/article/2023/06/30/who-is-the-real-sergei-shoigu-russia-s-defense-minister_6039898_117.html

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/11/world/europe/11sergeyev.html

[25] https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11114; https://t.me/dva_majors/42428; https://t.me/grey_zone/23041; https://t.me/grey_zone/23042; https://t.me/rybar/60025; https://t.me/milinfolive/122134

[26] https://t.me/rybar/60025; https://t.me/milinfolive/122134

[27] https://t.me/milinfolive/122134

[28] https://t.me/grey_zone/23041; https://t.me/grey_zone/23042

[29] https://t.me/brieflite/9220; https://t.me/rusbrief/224816

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-12-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424

[31] https://t.me/rybar/60025

[32] https://t.me/kremlin_sekret/14997  

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/19913; https://t.me/wargonzo/19914; https://t.me/wargonzo/19915

[34] https://t.me/astrapress/55362

[35] https://www.pravda.com dot ua/information/2024/05/13/7455579/

[36] https://t.me/mod_russia/38714

[37] https://suspilne dot media/744257-nastup-rosii-ta-evakuacia-ludej-na-prikordonni-harkivsini-zorstki-boi-na-doneccini-810-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1715587861&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-drony-sbu-rf-ataka-objektiv/32944100.html

[38] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/2651

[39] https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/estonia-seriously-discussing-sending-troops-to-rear-jobs-in-ukraine-official/

[40] https://www.ft.com/content material/c509400e-ed6b-4f9d-9cd4-bcabd57a01c4

[41] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0B3zWGHwXpsXH7aCDMCccGcZskb6Hv5ARHnj4UXLo7Z9bgXahCGL57VqRh82kmZXVl  

[42] https://t.me/motopatriot/22801; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68040  

[43] https://t.me/ombr_63/658 ; https://mil.in dot ua/uk/information/63-ombr-znyshhyla-10-tankiv-ta-bmp-okupantiv/; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10252 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1789955836543996080

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot/22785; https://t.me/motopatriot/22798; https://t.me/motopatriot/22803

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot/22803

[46] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0B3zWGHwXpsXH7aCDMCccGcZskb6Hv5ARHnj4UXLo7Z9bgXahCGL57VqRh82kmZXVl  

[47] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/18817; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1789935805894476155/historical past; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1789937016198586468; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/standing/1789953581564481889

[48] https://t.me/tass_agency/248523; https://t.me/andriyshTime/21855 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/21860; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/18817; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/2420

[49] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/38721

[51] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/14358  

[52] https://t.me/hategroupbambas/10; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8220; https://twitter.com/EjShahid/standing/1789924882773348464; https://t.me/Tourists51/183; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5491

[53] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10612  

[54] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10612; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10621; https://t.me/wargonzo/19902; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68035; https://t.me/dva_majors/42404 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14611  

[55] https://t.me/motopatriot/22785; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17663  

[56] https://suspilne dot media/744257-nastup-rosii-ta-evakuacia-ludej-na-prikordonni-harkivsini-zorstki-boi-na-doneccini-810-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1715592704&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[57] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl

[58] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/17673; https://t.me/rusich_army/14611; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10612  

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot/22796; https://t.me/wargonzo/19902

[60] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68035; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26803  

[61] https://t.me/dva_majors/42404; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56198; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10623

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/42404 https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56198; https://t.me/wargonzo/19902; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10626; . https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10587

[63] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56198

[64] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0B3zWGHwXpsXH7aCDMCccGcZskb6Hv5ARHnj4UXLo7Z9bgXahCGL57VqRh82kmZXVl  

[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/12199; https://t.me/kubanArta/757 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68021

[66] https://t.me/z_arhiv/26797

[67] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19902 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26797 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42404

[68] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68023

[69] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02uKeZwXSsXHo5dboWSEoNuzFG8DPFbkz5x5xWH3k2GSoKX5zDdeynLRWk6rusU52dl

[70] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10608

[71] https://www.wsj.com/world/russias-bombardment-of-ukraine-is-more-lethal-than-ever-afd733c4

[72] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/special-report-russian-strikes-more-effective-ukraine-exhausts-defenses

[73] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-27-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-23-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2024

[74] https://t.me/DIUkraine/3820

[75] https://t.me/tass_agency/248440 ; https://ria dot ru/20240513/dvornikov-1945510978.html

[76] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[77] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020324

[78] https://t.me/rsotmdivision/16138

[79] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122823

[80] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20776663

[81] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/kuharev-minsk-i-pekin-prorabatyvajut-vopros-vzaimodejstvija-v-sfere-vysokih-tehnologij-i-634062-2024/